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Class Certification as a Prerequisite for CAFA 
Jurisdiction 
Kevin Lampone 
After a federal court denies class certification, effectively 
declaring that the case before it is not a class action, should the 
case remain in federal court when the only basis for jurisdiction 
is its status as a class action? Despite Congress intending the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 20051 (CAFA) to allow “the exer-
cise of federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions with in-
terstate ramifications,”2 recent federal appellate decisions hold 
that CAFA provides federal jurisdiction even over cases that a 
court determines do not meet class action requirements.3 As a 
result, a single plaintiff ’s claim, potentially worth less than the 
filing fee of the case itself, may remain in federal court under 
CAFA.4  
Beyond that unintended result, there are many reasons 
federal courts should not find that CAFA jurisdiction remains 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2002, 
University of Minnesota. Thanks to Professor Bradley G. Clary for guidance, 
mentorship, and inspiration. I am immeasurably grateful to the Staff and Edi-
tors of the Minnesota Law Review, particularly Kelly McNabb, Andrew Hart, 
Rachel DeVries, and Anne Dwyer. Finally, many thanks to my immediate and 
extended family and friends, and especially to my wife, Janna Hottinger, for 
their unconditional support, encouragement, and perspective. Copyright 
© 2012 by Kevin Lampone.  
 1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 2. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34. 
 3. Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., Inc., 650 F.3d 1178, 1182 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500–01 (6th Cir. 2011); United Steel 
Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009).  
 4. See, e.g., Ronat v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Civil No. 
05-520-GPM, 2008 WL 4963214, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2008) (involving a pu-
tative class with individual claims worth less than $120 each). 
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after denying class certification.5 Some of those reasons are 
broad and abstract: federalism,6 separation of powers,7 and 
comity8 are just a few. Others are more practical, such as reduc-
ing the caseload of federal district courts.9  
For actual litigants, though, the more important reason is 
that when a federal court retains jurisdiction in these circum-
stances, it “sounds [a] death knell” for the plaintiffs.10 Without 
the potential for class-wide recovery, the individual representa-
tive plaintiff(s) in a putative class action remain in federal 
court without the resources to make continued litigation feasi-
ble.11 If federal courts do not retain jurisdiction, however, cases 
initiated in state court and removed to federal court through 
CAFA are remanded to state court, thereby retaining the po-
tential for a favorable outcome for the representative plain-
tiff(s) and the putative class.12  
 
 5. But see G. Shaun Richardson, Class Dismissed, Now What?: Exploring 
the Exercise of CAFA Jurisdiction After the Denial of Class Certification, 39 
N.M. L. REV. 121, 144–45 (2009) (detailing support for federal courts retaining 
jurisdiction). 
 6. See Heather Scribner, Protecting Federalism Interests After the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1417 passim (2005) (arguing 
that CAFA solved a horizontal federalism problem, but created a vertical one). 
 7. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101 (1998) 
(“The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an 
essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the 
courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting 
permanently regarding certain subjects.” (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974); United States v. Richard-
son, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974))); cf. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 1025 (2009) (arguing that fidelity to jurisdictional limits 
and principles maintains an appropriate balance between Congress and the 
federal courts). 
 8. Cf. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) 
(holding that for supplemental jurisdiction, “[n]eedless decisions of state law 
should be avoided . . . as a matter of comity”), superseded by statute, Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
 9. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2010) (noting belief 
among judges that federal dockets contained too many diversity jurisdiction 
cases). 
 10. Cf. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 
1999) (concluding that “the denial of class status sounds the death knell of the 
litigation” for the representative plaintiff, even without implicating jurisdic-
tional issues).  
 11. Id.  
 12. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376–77 (2011) (rejecting 
the preclusive effect of denying class certification in federal court on the issue 
of certification in state court, even where the language of the state certifica-
tion rule replicates the language of the federal rule); J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. 
Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that “the wide 
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Accordingly, a number of district courts correctly hold that 
denial of class certification requires the end of subject-matter 
jurisdiction through CAFA.13 But the lack of significant analy-
sis by those courts14 leaves their holdings susceptible to rever-
sal and criticism, especially as a number of federal appellate 
courts have begun to hold otherwise.15  
This Note presents the analysis necessary to conclude that 
class certification must be a prerequisite for continued jurisdic-
tion through CAFA. Part I begins with an overview of class ac-
tions and federal jurisdiction, then places the intersection of 
class certification and CAFA jurisdiction within that context. 
Part I concludes by detailing the holdings and analyses of 
courts and scholars that have addressed this issue. 
Part II analyzes the faulty assumptions that courts rely 
upon to find that CAFA jurisdiction remains after denial of 
class certification: (1) that Congress intended CAFA jurisdic-
tion to irrevocably attach at the moment of filing16 and (2) that 
the principle that post-removal events cannot alter jurisdiction 
applies to class certification.17 Part II tests those assumptions 
and concludes that class certification differs from post-removal 
events that do not alter jurisdiction, consistent with Congress’s 
 
discretion inherent in the decision as to whether or not to certify a class dic-
tates that each court—or at least each jurisdiction—be free to make its own 
determination in this regard”). 
 13. E.g., McGaughey v. Treistman, No. 05 Civ. 7069(HB), 2007 WL 24935, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007). 
 14. See, e.g., id. (“Because Plaintiff ’s motion for class certification must be 
denied, Plaintiff ’s action is no longer a class action, and this Court cannot re-
tain subject-matter jurisdiction in diversity over Plaintiff ’s action pursuant to 
the Class Action Fairness Act.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(“Although district courts have relied upon other language in CAFA to deter-
mine that they do not retain jurisdiction following denial of class certification, 
we agree with the [Seventh Circuit’s] contrary interpretation . . . .”); Mills v. 
Foremost Ins. Co., No. 806-CV-00986-EAK-AEP, 2011 WL 440163, at *4 (M.D. 
Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (citing three circuit courts of appeals as guiding the district 
court’s decision to retain jurisdiction); Long v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., Civ-
il Action No. 3:09CV-353-H, 2010 WL 2044524, at *2 (W.D. Ky. May 21, 2010) 
(finding “the reasoning espoused by the Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
more persuasive” and dismissing “that a few district courts have taken the op-
posite position”). 
 16. E.g., Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806 
(7th Cir. 2010). 
 17. E.g., id. at 807 (“Our conclusion vindicates the general principle that 
jurisdiction once properly invoked is not lost by developments after a suit is 
filed.” (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293–
95 (1938); In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam))). 
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intent to include class certification as a factor in determining 
continued CAFA jurisdiction.  
Part III explains why CAFA jurisdiction must end when a 
court denies class certification. When federal courts deny certi-
fication to a putative class, CAFA requires that cases initially 
filed in state court be remanded. This approach complies with 
Congress’s grant of jurisdiction in CAFA, conforms to estab-
lished precedent, and effectively balances the competing inter-
ests implicated by determinations of both jurisdiction and class 
certification.  
I.  CAFA JURISDICTION AND THE ROLE OF CLASS 
CERTIFICATION   
This Part provides background for understanding the in-
teraction between class certification and CAFA jurisdiction. To 
begin, Part I presents an overview of the purposes and proce-
dures of class actions, then outlines jurisdiction in federal 
courts generally and specifically in the context of class actions. 
Briefly, class actions allow multiple parties to jointly bring a 
claim or defense, subject to certain limitations.18 In addition to 
meeting class action requirements, a class action must also 
meet jurisdictional requirements—to hear any case, all courts 
must have jurisdiction both over the parties and over the con-
troversy at issue.19 For many class actions that otherwise could 
not be heard in federal court, CAFA provides that jurisdiction. 
With that background in place, Part I concludes by detailing 
existing approaches to determining CAFA jurisdiction for puta-
tive class actions when a court denies certification, rejecting 
the case’s sole basis for federal jurisdiction. 
A. CLASS ACTIONS 
A class action is a procedural device allowing a group too 
numerous to effectively sue or be sued individually to do so col-
lectively.20 Class actions allow “those with small claims for 
 
 18. See infra Part I.A (discussing class actions). 
 19. See infra Part I.B (discussing federal jurisdiction). Jurisdiction, as 
used in this Note, refers to subject-matter jurisdiction. CAFA does not impli-
cate jurisdiction over the parties—personal jurisdiction—and this Note’s use of 
the term “jurisdiction” similarly does not refer to personal jurisdiction. 
 20. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948). 
While initially only equitable claims qualified for class action treatment, the 
procedure now applies to all civil actions. Id. See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 2005) (de-
tailing the history and purpose of class actions). 
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whom individual litigation would be economically irrational to 
band together in group litigation against a common adver-
sary”21 with one or more plaintiffs representing the class.22 In 
addition to enabling plaintiffs to bring otherwise economically 
infeasible claims, class actions are “peculiarly appropriate” for 
issues and questions of law that apply to a class and “save[] the 
resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an 
issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated 
in an economical fashion.”23 
To utilize this procedural device, litigants must fit their 
putative class within a court’s procedural requirements for 
class actions. In federal courts, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure defines those requirements.24 Rule 23 includes 
two sets of procedural hurdles putative class actions must clear 
to proceed in federal court.25 First, putative class actions may 
be filed in federal court only if they meet certain prerequi-
sites,26 commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typi-
cality, and adequacy requirements.27 Second, the putative class 
must conform to one of three types of class actions28 based gen-
 
 21. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Histori-
cal Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1487 (2008). Class 
actions satisfy other goals as well. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1754 
(describing the objectives of class actions as “the efficient resolution of the 
claims or liabilities of many individuals in a single action, the elimination of 
repetitious litigation and possibly inconsistent adjudications involving com-
mon questions, related events, or requests for similar relief, and the estab-
lishment of an effective procedure for those whose economic position is such 
that it is unrealistic to expect them to seek to vindicate their rights in sepa-
rate lawsuits”). 
 22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring representative plaintiffs to “fair-
ly and adequately protect the interests of the class”). 
 23. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (second altera-
tion in original) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)). 
 24. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1438 (2010) (“[L]ike the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 23 automatically applies ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the Unit-
ed States district courts . . . .’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1 and citing Califano, 
442 U.S. at 699–700)). 
 25. Id. at 1437. 
 26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 27. See, e.g., Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (“The suit must satisfy the 
criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation) . . . .”). For further background on these re-
quirements, see generally 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 1759–71. 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
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erally on the relief sought and the individual and collective ef-
fect on putative class members.29  
Before the case may truly qualify as a class action,30 the 
court must certify that the class meets those procedural re-
quirements.31 Class certification, which must occur “at an early 
practicable time,”32 requires federal courts to define the class33 
and perform a rigorous analysis to ensure the class, as defined, 
conforms to the requirements.34 That rigorous analysis does not 
allow for assumptions about the validity of the facts satisfying 
class certification requirements.35  
Rule 23, as described above, provides the structure and 
procedure for class actions in federal court. Most states have 
similar, if not identical, rules for their courts;36 however, state 
rules—even those with language identical to the federal rule—
often apply more broadly, allowing more putative classes to fit 
within their requirements than federal courts allow.37 Regard-
less of forum, before a putative class may begin making its case 
for class treatment it must first establish that the court has ju-
risdiction to hear the case.38 
 
 29. 20 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 77. See generally 7AA WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 20, §§ 1772–84.1. 
 30. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438 (stating that both “eligibility and 
certifiability . . . . are preconditions” for class treatment under the federal rule 
and rejecting the argument that the two are distinct issues); Richard L. Mar-
cus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 
1778 (2008) (describing class actions as “constructs approved (indeed, created) 
by the court’s certification order”). 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). 
 32. Id. at 23(c)(1)(A). 
 33. Id. at 23(c)(1)(B). 
 34. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 
2008); see also Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). 
 35. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320; see also Falcon, 457 U.S. at 
160 (“[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains, however, 
indispensable.”). 
 36. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (providing the federal rules for 
class actions), with W. VA. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b) (providing West Virginia’s rules 
for class actions). 
 37. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2377–78 (2011) (comparing 
West Virginia’s rule to its federal counterpart); Allan Kanner, Interpreting the 
Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1654 
(2006) (noting plaintiffs’ greater difficulty achieving certification in federal 
courts than in state courts); Marcus, supra note 30, at 1797. 
 38. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1755. 
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B. FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction, as used in this Note, refers to the power of a 
court to hear a case. This form of jurisdiction—subject-matter 
jurisdiction—presumptively exists for cases filed in state 
courts.39 Federal courts, however, are courts of limited jurisdic-
tion and may only hear specifically defined types of cases.40  
Both the Constitution and Congress provide the limits on 
federal courts’ jurisdiction.41 The Constitution defines the ulti-
mate bounds of that jurisdiction,42 acting as a broad federalism-
based check protecting individual states.43 Those bounds are 
further limited by Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction.44 
As a separation-of-powers-based check on the judicial branch,45 
the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate federal juris-
diction.46 In practice, Congress must authorize and define con-
 
 39. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL 
COURTS § 7, at 27 (6th ed. 2002); id. § 45, at 289; Bloom, supra note 7, at 987 & 
n.96. 
 40. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 
(1978) (“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction.”), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–80 (1803) 
(holding that federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction beyond the limits set 
by both the Constitution and Congress). 
 41. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); Bender v. 
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) at 173–80. 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Bloom, 
supra note 7, at 987; see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174. 
 43. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), in 9 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 383, 395–98 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
 44. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583; see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 506, 512–13 (1868) (“[J]urisdiction . . . is not derived from acts of Con-
gress. It is, strictly speaking, conferred by the Constitution. But it is conferred 
‘with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make.’” 
(citation omitted)); Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Ab-
stention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097, 1125–27 (1985) (explaining that Congress’s 
power to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts is derived from the Con-
stitution). 
 45. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101 (1998). 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI (de-
fining the scope of federal jurisdiction and granting Congress the power to es-
tablish federal courts below the Supreme Court and to make exceptions and 
regulations for the exercise of federal jurisdiction); Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583; 
Bloom, supra note 7, at 987; see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 
512–13. 
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stitutionally permissible jurisdiction before federal courts may 
exercise it.47  
C. CAFA: FEDERAL JURISDICTION FOR CLASS ACTIONS 
While some class actions come within federal jurisdiction 
through the generally applicable grants of federal jurisdiction 
over cases involving federal laws (federal-question jurisdiction) 
or citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction),48 class ac-
tions often do not fit within those grants.49 For many class ac-
tions, CAFA provides jurisdiction to federal courts.50  
Congress enacted CAFA in response to “the numerous 
problems with our current class action system.”51 Because state 
court procedural rules often allow for certification of more class 
actions, Congress used CAFA to expand federal jurisdiction to 
 
 47. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). 
The opposite approach—that federal courts may always exercise jurisdiction 
over a case permitted by the Constitution unless Congress creates an excep-
tion—appears just as sensible, but was rejected by the judiciary. See Ex parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513 (explaining that Congress’s affirmative 
grant of jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, derived from Congress’s 
power to make exceptions and regulations to federal jurisdiction, implicates 
the negation of any jurisdiction not congressionally authorized (citing 
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810))). 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (federal question); id. § 1332 (diversity). 
 49. See Michael D.Y. Sukenik & Adam J. Levitt, CAFA and Federalized 
Ambiguity: The Case for Discretion in the Unpredictable Class Action, 120 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 233, 235 & n.5 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/ 
pdfs/945.pdf (describing barriers to federal jurisdiction over class actions prior 
to CAFA’s enactment); cf. Burbank, supra note 21, at 1495 (noting that in the 
context of torts, only state law frequently applies, eliminating federal-question 
jurisdiction). 
 50. Class actions may have independent bases for subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, but in those cases class certification will not affect the basis for jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 380 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (noting that CAFA jurisdiction was only implicated after standard 
diversity jurisdiction was defeated); Burbank, supra note 21, at 1450 (noting 
that CAFA only applies to class actions featuring classes of more than 100 
persons and more than $5 million in controversy). Class actions with fewer 
than 100 persons are certifiable under Rule 23, but do not qualify for CAFA 
jurisdiction. See Phila. Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 
463 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (allowing a class of twenty-five plaintiffs under Rule 23). 
This Note examines the sections of CAFA that comprise “the heart” of the 
statute, but CAFA also provides a Consumer Bill of Rights and jurisdiction for 
mass actions—certain types of cases with over 100 plaintiffs—that would not 
otherwise meet class action requirements. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLASS AC-
TION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: WITH COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 9–22, 32–38 
(2005). 
 51. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5. 
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include most interstate class actions.52 Simply put, Congress 
sought to utilize federal class action procedures to effect sub-
stantive change in class action litigation; more accurately, Con-
gress expanded federal jurisdiction to allow federal class action 
procedures to effect those substantive changes.53 
CAFA effects these changes through an expansion of diver-
sity jurisdiction.54 While the Constitution allows for federal ju-
risdiction so long as minimal diversity55 exists, the generally 
applicable diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires com-
plete diversity.56 CAFA enables federal jurisdiction for class ac-
tions with only minimal diversity,57 so long as more than $5 
million is in controversy and the class contains at least 100 
members.58 CAFA applies the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s 
definition of a class action to define cases for which CAFA may 
provide jurisdiction,59 but does not make clear if that definition 
 
 52. Id. at 4–5, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5–7. 
 53. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 30, at 1788–89 ( “ [CAFA] was justified on 
the basis of essentially two jurisdictional policies: it provided that federal class 
action procedures would be available for handling many state law class action 
cases, and it ensured a federal forum for cases of national significance.”); Da-
vid Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Impli-
cations of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1310–11 (2007) 
[hereinafter Marcus, Erie, CAFA, and Federalism] (noting that “CAFA simply 
expands diversity jurisdiction,” but suggesting that “Congress cloak[ed] its 
substantive goal of limiting liability for state law causes of action in a proce-
dural guise”). 
 54. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6. 
 55. Rather than requiring that all plaintiffs’ citizenship differ from all de-
fendants’, as with complete diversity, only one plaintiff ’s and one defendant’s 
citizenship must differ. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI. 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) ( limiting diversity jurisdiction to actions 
between “citizens of different States”); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity under the statute); see 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (clarifying 
that Strawbridge’s complete diversity requirement derived from the statute, 
not the Constitution, and reaffirming that the Constitution requires only min-
imal diversity). See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 39, § 24, 158–60 
(describing implications and evolution of complete and minimal diversity).  
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) ( limiting federal jurisdiction to class actions in 
which “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from 
any defendant”). 
 58. Id. (amount in controversy); id. § 1332(d)(5)(B) (numerosity). 
 59. Id. §§ 1332(d)(1)(B), 1711(2); see also infra notes 130–36 and accom-
panying text (arguing that CAFA’s use of the Rule 23 definition of class action 
weighs against determining jurisdiction only at the time of filing suit). Rule 23 
sets out the factors courts use to make certification decisions, thereby defining 
class actions. 
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should include cases filed as class actions but denied class certi-
fication.60  
For cases meeting its requirements, CAFA allows for juris-
diction both when the case is initiated in federal court and in 
most cases when the defendant seeks to remove cases initiated 
in state court.61 Regardless of which method brings a putative 
class action to federal court, the court must approve or reject 
certification.62 When courts deny certification, CAFA does not 
provide a clear answer to the question raised by the following 
cases: what happens to jurisdiction premised on a case’s classi-
fication as a class action after the court rejects that  
classification?63 
D. CLASS CERTIFICATION’S ROLE IN CAFA JURISDICTION 
Generally, federal courts have reached one of three conclu-
sions about what effect the denial of class certification has on 
CAFA jurisdiction64: (1) that CAFA jurisdiction must end with 
the denial of certification,65 (2) that CAFA jurisdiction remains, 
but the court should not exercise that jurisdiction,66 or (3) that 
 
 60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8); Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 
(6th Cir. 2011) (“CAFA does not specifically address whether a district court 
may retain jurisdiction following the denial of class certification.”). 
 61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). For background on removal, see generally 
Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 61–66 
(2008) (types of jurisdictional provisions in removal statutes); Steven Plitt & 
Joshua D. Rogers, Charting a Course for Federal Removal Through the Absten-
tion Doctrine, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 109–13 (2006) (explaining removal). 
 62. See, e.g., Clausnitzer v. Fed. Express Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 
1268–69 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (examining certification decisions both in cases ini-
tially filed in federal court and in cases removed to federal court). Remand im-
plicates additional considerations, such as forum-shopping and appellate con-
sequences, however. See Allen-Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 07-
cv-4087, 2009 WL 1285522, at *2 n.6 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2009). 
 63. Metz, 649 F.3d at 500; United Steel Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil 
Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Even though CAFA indisputably 
creates original federal jurisdiction prior to class certification, the statute does 
not say whether the post-removal denial of class certification divests the fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 64. See Allen-Wright, 2009 WL 1285522, at *1 n.5 (contrasting outcomes 
in eighteen cases that ruled on the issue). 
 65. See, e.g., Salazar v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., No. 07-cv-0064-IEG 
(WMC), 2008 WL 5054108, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008); Clausnitzer, 621 
F. Supp. 2d at 1269–70; McGaughey v. Treistman, No. 05 Civ. 7069(HB), 2007 
WL 24935, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007). 
 66. See, e.g., Giannini v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. C-06-06823-SBA, 
2007 WL 1839789, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2007) (applying supplemental-
jurisdiction standards to decline exercise of jurisdiction); see also Richardson, 
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CAFA jurisdiction remains and the court should continue to ex-
ercise it.67 The following Section examines the reasoning sup-
porting each of these conclusions. 
1. Courts Denying Class Certification Do Not Retain 
Jurisdiction Through CAFA 
A number of federal district courts across the country hold 
that denial of class certification ousts jurisdiction through 
CAFA.68 Those courts have at times qualified their holdings, for 
example deciding that jurisdiction is ousted only if “it is clear 
there is no foreseeable possibility that the plaintiff may obtain 
certification in the future.”69 Courts that have made unqualified 
holdings have provided little support for their findings, as in 
McGaughey v. Treistman: “Because Plaintiff ’s motion for class 
certification must be denied, Plaintiff ’s action is no longer a 
class action, and this Court cannot retain subject-matter juris-
diction in diversity over Plaintiff ’s action pursuant to the Class 
Action Fairness Act.”70 In contrast, courts holding that jurisdic-
tion remains provide more support and analysis, whether they 
exercise it or not.  
2. Courts Denying Class Certification Retain Jurisdiction 
Through CAFA, but Should Not Exercise It 
Some courts have determined, and scholars have argued, 
that federal courts retain jurisdiction after denial of class certi-
fication, but that jurisdiction should not be exercised based on 
discretionary standards of either supplemental jurisdiction71 or 
the abstention doctrine.72 For example, in Giannini v. Schering-
Plough Corp., the Northern District of California held that ju-
risdiction for CAFA is only measured at the time of filing and 
therefore determined it retained jurisdiction.73 The court went 
on, however, to reason that the original claim supporting juris-
diction was dismissed when the class certification was denied74 
 
supra note 5, at 141–47 (arguing for use of abstention to decline exercise of  
jurisdiction). 
 67. See, e.g., Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01. 
 68. E.g., Salazar, 2008 WL 5054108, at *5–6; Clausnitzer, 621 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1269–70; McGaughey, 2007 WL 24935, at *3. 
 69. Clausnitzer, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1270. 
 70. McGaughey, 2007 WL 24935, at *3. 
 71. See, e.g., Giannini, 2007 WL 1839789, at *2–4. 
 72. Richardson, supra note 5, at 141–47. 
 73. Giannini, 2007 WL 1839789, at *2. 
 74. See id. at *3. 
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and analyzed the claim anew in the context of supplemental ju-
risdiction.75 Concluding that the elements of supplemental ju-
risdiction analysis—judicial economy, convenience and fair-
ness, and comity—were best served by remand to state court, 
the court declined to exercise its jurisdiction.76 
Another approach is that after denial of class certification, 
courts retain CAFA jurisdiction, but should decline to exercise 
it through the abstention doctrine.77 The abstention doctrine 
balances the interests of federal courts hearing a case “against 
countervailing concerns, such as comity and federalism.”78 In 
the context of CAFA jurisdiction after a court denies class certi-
fication, application of the abstention doctrine acknowledges 
the minimal interest federal courts have in retaining cases that 
no longer meet class action requirements.79 Implicit in this ap-
plication of abstention is that federal courts always retain ju-
risdiction after denying class certification.  
Though both of these approaches properly conclude that 
CAFA jurisdiction should not be exercised after a court denies 
class certification, they only reach that conclusion after finding 
that certification has no effect on CAFA jurisdiction. In so find-
ing, both approaches rely on the same reasoning as courts fol-
lowing the approach examined in the following subsection.80 
3. Courts Denying Class Certification Retain Jurisdiction 
Through CAFA, and Should Exercise It 
Other courts hold that they retain jurisdiction through 
CAFA despite denying class certification.81 These courts tend to 
rely on two assumptions. One assumption focuses on use of the 
word “filed” in CAFA’s definition of a class action.82 The other 
assumption relies on the general principle that once a court ac-
quires subject-matter jurisdiction, later events do not eliminate 
 
 75. Id. at *3–4. Supplemental jurisdiction grants courts jurisdiction over 
claims that would not independently establish jurisdiction by latching onto 
other related claims that do establish jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
 76. Giannini, 2007 WL 1839789, at *4. 
 77. See Richardson, supra note 5, at 141–47. 
 78. Id. at 141. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 128–29.  
 81. Allen-Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 07-cv-4087, 2009 
WL 1285522, at *1 n.5 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2009) (citing eight such cases). 
 82. E.g., Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806 
(7th Cir. 2010); Allen-Wright, 2009 WL 1285522, at *3. 
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that jurisdiction.83 Both of those assumptions are explained in 
Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc.84 In that case, the 
Seventh Circuit overturned a federal district court’s remand to 
state court after the district court had denied class  
certification.85  
To come to that decision, the Seventh Circuit first looked to 
CAFA’s definition of a class action.86 CAFA defines a class ac-
tion as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial 
procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more rep-
resentative persons as a class action.”87 Though the court rec-
ognized some ambiguity in that definition’s interaction with 
other parts of CAFA, it relied on the definition’s use of the word 
filed to determine that jurisdiction attaches when the suit is 
commenced.88  
After finding that CAFA jurisdiction attached upon com-
mencement of a suit, the court further held that this jurisdic-
tion cannot be ousted by later developments.89 Calling this hold-
ing a “general principle,” the court cited St. Paul Mercury 
Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.90 In St. Paul Mercury, the plain-
tiff filed a complaint in state court that alleged damages suffi-
cient to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement 
for federal jurisdiction.91 After the defendant removed the case 
to federal court, the plaintiff amended the complaint to lower 
the alleged damages below the jurisdictional threshold.92 On 
review, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction remained, 
however, analogizing the issue to when a party changes place of 
citizenship after a complaint is filed to destroy diversity juris-
 
 83. E.g., Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807; Allen-Wright, 2009 WL 1285522, 
at *3–4. 
 84. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806–07. While other courts of appeals and 
district courts have addressed the issue, Cunningham includes the relevant 
analysis from those other similar cases. See cases cited supra note 3. 
 85. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 804–05. 
 86. Id. at 806; see also Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 
2011). 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 88. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806 (“But remember that jurisdiction at-
taches when a suit is filed as a class action, and that invariably precedes certi-
fication.”); see also Metz, 649 F.3d at 500. 
 89. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807; see also Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01. 
 90. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. 
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293–95 (1938)); see also Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01. 
 91. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 284. 
 92. Id. at 285. 
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diction.93 In situations such as these, courts seek to prevent 
parties from forum manipulation by holding that these actions 
do not oust jurisdiction.94 Conversely, where jurisdiction is not 
yet properly invoked, destroying the basis for jurisdiction and 
making remand to state court proper.95 Though the Seventh 
Circuit recognized exceptions to this principle, and their poten-
tial application to CAFA, it found the exceptions were not ap-
plicable in Cunningham.96 
Cunningham exemplifies the reasoning behind federal 
courts retaining jurisdiction through CAFA after a federal 
court denies class certification; but it is just one example. The 
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits97 have similarly 
concluded that jurisdiction through CAFA does not depend on 
class certification.98 However, this line of reasoning is troubling 
for the reasons detailed below,99 making further analysis ex-
ploring the two assumptions exemplified by Cunningham nec-
essary. The following Part analyzes the reasoning of those fed-
eral courts that, like Cunningham, find jurisdiction remains 
through CAFA despite denying class certification. 
II.  CAFA JURISDICTION DOES NOT IRREVOCABLY 
ATTACH AT THE MOMENT OF FILING   
Courts holding that CAFA jurisdiction remains despite 
denying class certification tend to rely on two erroneous as-
sumptions: (1) that CAFA jurisdiction fully attaches when the 
case is filed as a class action, and (2) that once CAFA jurisdic-
 
 93. Id. at 289–90, 294–95. 
 94. See id. at 294 (finding that “the plaintiff ought not to be able to . . . 
bring the cause back to the state court at his election,” subjecting the defend-
ant’s right to removal to the plaintiff ’s caprice). 
 95. Cf. id. at 295 (when removing defendants are dismissed, leaving only 
parties involuntarily in federal court, courts should remand to state court). 
 96. Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th 
Cir. 2010). Examples the Cunningham court suggests include mootness aris-
ing during litigation, amended pleadings eliminating jurisdiction, or when 
there never really was jurisdiction to start with. Id.; see also Metz v. Unizan 
Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 501 n.4 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 97. Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., Inc., 650 F.3d 1178, 1182 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01; United Steel Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 
602 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010); Vega v. T–Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 
1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 98. A number of district courts have come to similar conclusions. E.g., Al-
len-Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 07-cv-4087, 2009 WL 1285522, 
at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2009). 
 99. See infra Part II. 
 2012] CAFA JURISDICTION 1165 
 
tion attaches at filing, it cannot be ousted by later events.100 
These courts, however, have recognized the potential flaws in 
those assumptions.101 This Part examines those assumptions 
and their flaws—both of which weigh against federal courts re-
taining jurisdiction through CAFA after denying class  
certification.  
A. CAFA DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO DETERMINE 
JURISDICTION SOLELY AT THE TIME OF FILING 
To determine that jurisdiction should only be measured at 
the time of filing, federal courts holding that jurisdiction re-
mains despite denying class certification misapply CAFA’s def-
inition of a class action.102 Because CAFA’s definition of a class 
action uses the phrase “filed under,”103 these federal courts con-
clude that upon the act of filing a complaint (as a class action) 
CAFA jurisdiction irrevocably attaches.104 This conclusion erro-
neously relies on the word “filed” only meaning “to file,”105 ra-
ther than “on file,”106 instead.  
That meaning, focused solely on the act of filing rather 
than the continuing status of a case remaining on file, is incor-
rect for three reasons. First, Congress used the word “com-
 
 100. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 101. See, e.g., Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806 (noting that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(8) may imply CAFA jurisdiction is limited to cases where courts cer-
tify a class and that § 1332(d)(1)(C) may mean the lack of a certification order 
puts a case outside the definition of a class action); Allen-Wright, 2009 WL 
1285522, at *3 (noting that denial of class certification should be addressed 
differently than changes in citizenship or amount in controversy); cf. United 
Steel Workers, 602 F.3d at 1092 n.3 (recognizing exceptions to the rule of “once 
jurisdiction, always jurisdiction,” including situations where there was “no ju-
risdiction to begin with because the jurisdictional allegations were frivolous 
from the start”); Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807 (same). 
 102. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(1)(B), 1711(2) (2006); see Coll. of Dental Sur-
geons of P.R. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(“To satisfy CAFA’s definition of a class action, a case need only be ‘filed under’ 
either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or some state-law analogue of that 
rule.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 104. E.g., Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806 (stating that jurisdiction attaches 
when a suit is filed as a class action); see also Richardson, supra note 5, at 135, 
139–40 (“Under CAFA’s plain language, CAFA jurisdiction attaches the mo-
ment a pleading featuring class allegations . . . is filed, and . . . an order deny-
ing class certification . . . cannot destroy that jurisdiction.”). 
 105. “To file” meaning the act of “submit[ting] documents necessary to ini-
tiate a legal proceeding.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 467 
(11th ed. 2003). 
 106. “On file” meaning “in or as if in a file for ready reference.” Id. 
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menced” in the statute to express that meaning and to narrow-
ly focus on the moment of filing. Second, Congress’s other uses 
of the word “filed” throughout CAFA, and other structural con-
siderations, similarly demonstrate Congress understood the 
phrase “filed under” to require continuing status as a class ac-
tion. Last, CAFA’s reliance on Rule 23’s definition of a class ac-
tion shows Congress did not intend for courts to measure juris-
diction solely at the instant of filing, but instead intended 
CAFA’s jurisdiction only to apply to a case that remains a class 
action filed under Rule 23. Each of these reasons is examined 
below.  
First, federal courts finding CAFA jurisdiction remains de-
spite denying class certification mistakenly apply the meaning 
of the word “commenced”107 to the phrase “filed under.”108 For 
instance, in Cunningham, the Seventh Circuit stated: “[CAFA] 
jurisdiction attaches when a suit is filed as a class action, and 
that invariably precedes certification.”109 There, the Seventh 
Circuit forces the word “filed” to mean initiated or begun, as it 
focuses on a single point in time that must precede certifica-
tion.110 But when Congress intended to convey that same mean-
ing (initiated or begun), it used the word “commenced.”111 To 
make clear that CAFA would only apply to cases initiated after 
the statute’s enactment, Congress made clear the statute would 
only apply to class actions “commenced on or after the date of 
enactment” of CAFA.112  
 
 107. “Commence” may be used as a transitive verb meaning “to enter upon: 
BEGIN” or as an intransitive verb meaning “to have or make a beginning: 
START.” Id. at 249. 
 108. “File” may be used as a transitive verb meaning “to place among offi-
cial records as prescribed by law” or “to initiate (as a legal action) through 
proper formal procedure.” Id. at 467. “File” may also be used as an intransitive 
verb meaning “to submit documents necessary to initiate a legal proceeding.” 
Id. 
 109. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806. 
 110. Id.  
 111. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 
14 (codified in scattered sections 28 U.S.C.). 
 112. Id. (emphasis added) (“The amendments made by this Act shall apply 
to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.”). 
What exactly the word “commenced” meant was itself a matter of great debate, 
see, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The “Commencement” Problem: Lessons 
from a Statute’s First Year, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 469, 474–509 (2006) (exam-
ining issues raised in defining the word “commenced”), but it certainly more 
precisely means what courts have attempted to define the phrase “filed under” 
to mean here.  
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Using both the word “commenced” and the word “filed” 
shows Congress understood the two words to have different 
meanings.113 If Congress intended its definition of cases to 
which CAFA’s jurisdictional grant applies to mean all cases ini-
tiated or begun under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure (or a state-law analogue),114 “commenced” is the word 
used later in the statute to mean exactly that. Because “certain 
language in one part of the statute and different language in 
another” creates an assumption that “different meanings were 
intended,”115 CAFA’s use of the word “filed” instead of the word 
“commenced” in the definition of a class action supports requir-
ing class certification for continued CAFA jurisdiction.116  
Second, in addition to the filed/commenced distinction, 
numerous other examples in the structure of CAFA similarly 
require the word “filed” to mean more than simply the moment 
of filing. One example is the repeated use of the phrase “origi-
nally filed” in other sections of CAFA.117 While the word “filed” 
is susceptible to the meaning federal courts have given it in or-
der to retain jurisdiction after denying class certification,118 
there is no need to modify it with “originally” if Congress in-
tended it to mean, or believed it would be interpreted to mean, 
 
 113. The word “filed” is susceptible to the meaning courts like Cunningham 
have imputed to it, see supra note 108 (noting that the definition of “file” in-
cludes initiating a legal action), but given that the word “commenced” more 
precisely means the same thing, see supra note 107, the same meaning should 
not unnecessarily be applied to both words. See infra note 115 and accompany-
ing text. 
 114. The inclusion of state-law analogues could suggest Congress’s focus 
narrowed to the moment of filing, since a class action is never filed under state 
procedural rules in federal court. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
But CAFA could not supply jurisdiction for removal if it only applied to cases 
filed under the federal law, since cases filed in state court could never apply 
the federal rule without CAFA first providing federal jurisdiction. Therefore, it 
must apply to cases filed under both state and federal class action rules. Cf. 
infra notes 124–29 and accompanying text (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) 
plays a similar role in creating jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist for 
cases filed in state court). 
 115. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (quoting 2A 
NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 46:6, at 194 (6th rev. ed. 2000)). 
 116. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 112, at 482–83 (comparing conflicting inter-
pretations of “commenced” and finding courts consistently apply the meaning 
that more “strictly constru[es] the scope of federal jurisdiction”). 
 117. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3), (3)(B), (3)(E), (4)(A)(i)(I), (4)(A)(i)(II)(cc), 
(4)(A)(i)(III) (2006). 
 118. See supra note 113 (arguing that this definition is not incorrect, but in 
this context that definition should not be applied as it makes use of the word 
“commenced” later in the statute unnecessary). 
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the same thing as the word “commenced.” Just as courts should 
assume Congress does not intend the same meaning for two dif-
ferent words,119 courts should “give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any con-
struction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the 
meaning of the language it employed.”120 If “filed under” al-
ready means “originally filed,” adding “originally” in other are-
as of the statute requires “originally” to have no meaning.  
Additional examples found in the structure of CAFA that 
weigh against measuring jurisdiction only at the moment of fil-
ing include 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(C), which states CAFA’s def-
inition of a class certification order, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8), 
which states when CAFA’s jurisdictional grant applies. Section 
1332(d)(1)(C) defines a class certification order as “approving 
the treatment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a class 
action.”121 The Seventh Circuit recognized in Cunningham that 
“this could mean that in the absence of such an order a suit is 
not a class action,”122 and therefore CAFA jurisdiction cannot 
continue. But, by first focusing on jurisdiction irrevocably at-
taching at the moment of filing, that court held that a class cer-
tification order is unnecessary for continued jurisdiction.123 On-
ly by first assuming jurisdiction is measured solely at the time 
of filing, however, does that reasoning hold. 
The Seventh Circuit similarly dismissed 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(8), which states that CAFA’s jurisdictional grant 
“appl[ies] to any class action before or after the entry of a class 
certification order.”124 Calling this provision irrelevant, the 
court guessed that “[p]robably all this means is that the de-
fendant can wait until a class is certified before deciding 
whether to remove the case to federal court” through CAFA.125 
Other courts, however, have recognized that this provision 
 
 119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 120. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883). 
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(C). 
 122. Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
 123. Id. (“But remember that jurisdiction attaches when a suit is filed as a 
class action, and that invariably precedes certification. All that [the definition] 
means is that a suit filed as a class action cannot be maintained as one with-
out an order certifying the class. That needn’t imply that unless the class is 
certified the court loses jurisdiction of the case.” (alterations in original)); see 
also Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 124. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8). 
 125. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806; see also Metz, 649 F.3d at 500. 
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means CAFA requires a certification order to provide continu-
ing jurisdiction.126  
While the Seventh Circuit considered § 1332(d)(8) irrele-
vant to class certification’s role in CAFA jurisdiction,127 in fact 
the provision is necessary for class actions filed directly in fed-
eral court. If CAFA only applied after a certification order, it 
could never provide jurisdiction from the commencement of the 
suit through that order. Instead, it would only provide jurisdic-
tion in the circumstances the Cunningham court described 
(when a case commences in state court, is certified by that 
court, and then removed by the defendant to federal court). Of 
course, under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, only the moment 
of filing matters for CAFA jurisdiction.128 But if only the mo-
ment of filing matters in determining CAFA jurisdiction, there 
is no reason to add that CAFA jurisdiction applies before and 
after certification. Again, the Seventh Circuit’s approach to 
class certification’s effect on CAFA jurisdiction ignores the 
principle that courts should “give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute.”129 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, CAFA’s reliance up-
on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to define 
class actions130 militates against measuring jurisdiction only at 
the moment of filing. Rule 23 contemplates its numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and representative adequacy require-
ments as prerequisites131 to successfully “filing” a class action. 
The Supreme Court similarly calls Rule 23’s certification fac-
tors “preconditions for maintaining a class action;” indeed, the 
 
 126. See, e.g., Ronat v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Civil No. 05-
520-GPM, 2008 WL 4963214, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2008) (“In examining the 
statute itself, it is clear to this Court that CAFA does not provide a basis for 
subject-matter jurisdiction after a court denies class certification. By its terms, 
it ‘shall apply to any class action before or after the entry of a class certifica-
tion order by the court with respect to that action.’ Under the statute, ‘the 
term ‘class certification order’ means an order issued by a court approving the 
treatment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a class action.’ This is no 
longer a class action and so the case ends here.” (citations omitted)). 
 127. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2006) (defining a class action as any civ-
il action brought to federal court through Rule 23 or a state-law analogue); id. 
§ 1711(2) (same). 
 131. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) ( listing the class action requirements in a section 
entitled “Prerequisites”); see Ronat, 2008 WL 4963214, at *4 (“[T]he Rule 23(a) 
prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy . . . . are 
prerequisites to class certification . . . .”). 
 1170 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1151 
 
Court clearly articulated how Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites impact 
class allegations: “[T]he line between eligibility and 
certifiability is entirely artificial.”132 Certification must occur133 
and Rule 23 instructs courts and litigants to determine if a pu-
tative class action meets Rule 23’s preconditions “[a]t an early 
practicable time.”134 Until that time, however, the putative class 
action is no more than that—litigants have no right to proceed 
as a class if Rule 23’s prerequisites are not met, and if the pu-
tative class is not certifiable, it was never eligible for class 
treatment. That length of time, from the moment of filing until 
certification, explains why 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) must specify 
that CAFA supplies jurisdiction before, as well as after, the cer-
tification decision. If not, federal courts would exercise jurisdic-
tion without any congressional authorization. Thus, a putative 
class action is not truly a class action until the inextricably in-
tertwined eligibility and certification questions are answered at 
certification. Because CAFA relies on that definition and pro-
cess to determine if its jurisdictional grant applies to a putative 
class action, CAFA jurisdiction not fully or properly invoked 
until certification. 
Taken together, the above-referenced elements of CAFA 
lead to the conclusion that jurisdiction should not be measured 
solely at the instant of filing, but instead also at class certifica-
tion, when the court determines the case is, in fact, a class ac-
tion. Courts like Cunningham, however, preclude that finding 
by presuming that the moment of filing is the only instant 
when jurisdiction must be measured.135 Similarly, by making 
that presumption, these courts preclude the finding that the 
structure of CAFA weighs heavily against measuring jurisdic-
tion only at that instant. And as the following Section shows, 
these courts’ reasoning also leads to misapplication of prece-
dent requiring that once jurisdiction fully attaches it cannot be 
ousted.  
B. ST. PAUL MERCURY DOES NOT REQUIRE CAFA JURISDICTION 
TO IRREVOCABLY ATTACH AT THE MOMENT OF FILING 
In addition to misinterpreting Congress’s use of the phrase 
“filed under,” courts that take the Cunningham approach also 
 
 132. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1438 (2010). 
 133. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
 135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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misapply the principle that, after jurisdiction properly attach-
es, later changes to jurisdictional facts cannot oust it.136 That 
principle, derived from St. Paul Mercury, appropriately applies 
to later events or changes that a litigant may control and po-
tentially abuse.137 By presuming that jurisdiction is properly 
and fully invoked at the moment of filing, though, the Cun-
ningham court failed to question whether changes to the 
amount in controversy or place of citizenship are appropriate 
comparisons to class certification, which implicates far less risk 
of manipulation or abuse by litigants.138 The following examines 
that question by comparing and contrasting these jurisdictional 
determinations. In this context, class certification—and its ef-
fect on CAFA jurisdiction—is not a later event or change falling 
within the ambit of St. Paul Mercury, unlike other more com-
mon jurisdictional determinations.139  
St. Paul Mercury cannot bear the weight that the Seventh 
Circuit and other courts have placed on it for a number of rea-
sons. Perhaps most importantly, class certification is not anal-
ogous to the events to which St. Paul Mercury traditionally ap-
plies.140 St. Paul Mercury’s principle applies to the effect of 
changes to amounts in controversy for purposes of jurisdiction-
al minimums.141 In that context, courts may presume that the 
amount a plaintiff pleads in good faith establishes jurisdiction, 
and “[t]he inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate 
to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust 
the jurisdiction.”142 But federal courts cannot make similar pre-
sumptions based on the pleadings in the class action context. 
While good-faith pleadings are sufficient to establish the 
 
 136. See supra Part I.D.3 (describing how the Cunningham court sought to 
vindicate this principle). 
 137. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab. Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294–95 
(1938); cf. In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 
2010) (noting that “concerns about forum manipulation . . . counsel against” 
allowing post-removal events to oust jurisdiction). 
 138. See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
 139. Cf. Marcus, supra note 30 (describing class actions as “constructs” on-
ly created when the court approves the class by defining and certifying it). 
 140. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They?: Tort Re-
form Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 887 n.148 (1995) (explaining how, 
until 28 U.S.C. § 1367 codified supplemental jurisdiction, St. Paul Mercury 
could not apply to class actions as it does to other cases due to the existence of 
absent class members). 
 141. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 294–95. 
 142. Id. at 288–89. 
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amount in controversy, Rule 23 forbids such presumptions to 
establish a class.143 
Even if Rule 23 allowed for good-faith class allegations to 
suffice, class certification remains distinct from the jurisdic-
tional facts to which St. Paul Mercury traditionally applies. St. 
Paul Mercury’s principle applies to amounts in controversy;144 a 
similar principle applies to diversity of citizenship.145 Both prin-
ciples prevent changes to the facts required for jurisdiction 
from ousting jurisdiction.146 For instance, if a plaintiff reduces 
the amount claimed or moves to a different state, these changes 
or events cannot oust properly invoked jurisdiction.147 Class cer-
tification, however, does not amount to a change in jurisdic-
tional facts at all. Rather, class certification requires the court 
to examine the facts required for jurisdiction as they stand, and 
as they stood at pleading.148 The result of this examination is 
not a change or later event as contemplated by St. Paul Mercu-
ry; instead, it is simply a required analysis of the sufficiency 
and adequacy of the pleadings.149 
St. Paul Mercury itself confirms that when jurisdictional 
requirements are insufficient or inadequate from the outset, 
the court’s examination to determine the sufficiency of those 
requirements can affect jurisdiction; such an examination does 
not amount to a change or event that cannot affect jurisdiction. 
 
 143. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (calling 
certification of “actual, not presumed, conformance” to Rule 23’s prerequisites 
“indispensable”). In some cases, the pleadings may sufficiently allow a court to 
determine the appropriateness of class treatment. Id. But in all cases, even 
when making the determination goes to the merits of a claim, federal courts 
must certify that a putative class is properly filed under Rule 23. See id. at 161 
(reiterating that all class actions must meet Rule 23’s prerequisites, as subject 
to a trial court’s “rigorous analysis” through certification). 
 144. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 294–95. 
 145. Id. (citing, inter alia, Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 
(1824)). 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
 148. See Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores v. Dow Quimica de Colombia, 
988 F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Under those circumstances, the court is 
still examining the jurisdictional facts as of the time the case is removed, but 
the court is considering information submitted after removal.”), abrogated by 
Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 526 
U.S. 574 (1999). 
 149. See id. (distinguishing examination or supplementation of ambiguous 
jurisdictional fact from the type of change contemplated by St. Paul Mercury); 
cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1438 (2010) (rejecting argument that there is a distinction between a putative 
class being eligible and being certifiable). 
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The Court stated that “[e]vents occurring subsequent to the in-
stitution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the 
statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction,” but qualified that 
statement that  
if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, 
that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the 
proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never 
was entitled to recover that amount . . . the suit will be dismissed.150 
The Court’s qualification makes clear that a facially inade-
quate basis for jurisdiction is insufficient. A court’s determina-
tion of whether a class can be certified is an analogous inquiry 
into the adequacy of the pleadings, not a subsequent change in 
events that St. Paul Mercury bars from ousting jurisdiction.  
For those reasons, courts cannot approach class allegations 
in the same way they approach amounts in controversy and 
places of citizenship.151 Class certification is not a later event or 
change that cannot affect jurisdiction; under Rule 23, and 
through CAFA, it is a required jurisdictional determination as-
sessing whether the putative class is in fact entitled to class 
treatment.152 As such, CAFA jurisdiction cannot be irrevocably 
invoked at the moment of filing. 
In sum, to retain jurisdiction after denying class certifica-
tion, federal courts rely on two erroneous assumptions. First, 
the courts interpret CAFA to only require a case to meet the 
statute’s definition of a class action at the moment of filing.153 
Second, the courts then misapply the principle that properly 
invoked jurisdiction cannot be ousted by later events.154 Both of 
these assumptions are necessary to hold that jurisdiction re-
mains after a court denies class certification.155 Relying on those 
assumptions forces courts to misapply CAFA and wrongly 
 
 150. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289–90. 
 151. Cf. In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) 
(requiring jurisdiction be measured “as of the instant of removal” to federal 
court). Because a court must certify that a class meets numerosity, commonal-
ity, typicality, and representative adequacy requirements to comply with Rule 
23, the “instant of removal” is an imprecise, and ultimately unworkable, fic-
tion in this context. 
 152. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (distinguishing between 
applying St. Paul Mercury in cases when jurisdiction is and is not properly in-
voked).  
 153. E.g., Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807 
(7th Cir. 2010). 
 154. E.g., id. 
 155. If the case’s status is relevant beyond the moment of filing, the cases 
regarding later events would be inapplicable. Similarly, if those cases do not 
apply, the timing of the case’s status is irrelevant. 
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analogize denial of class certification to changes in citizenship 
or the amount in controversy to allow continued jurisdiction. As 
the following Part shows, requiring class certification for con-
tinued jurisdiction through CAFA better follows CAFA’s plain 
language, fits within St. Paul Mercury’s reasoning, and meets 
Congress’s goals in enacting CAFA. 
III.  FEDERAL COURTS CANNOT RETAIN JURISDICTION 
THROUGH CAFA AFTER DENYING CLASS 
CERTIFICATION   
This Note asserts that after denying class certification, 
federal courts lose jurisdiction over cases filed as class actions, 
making certification a prerequisite for continued CAFA juris-
diction. As described above, the approach that a number of 
courts of appeals have begun to adopt misapplies CAFA’s juris-
dictional grant and wrongly applies case law holding that once 
a case is in federal court, jurisdiction cannot be ousted.156  
A better approach to jurisdiction after a federal court de-
clines to certify a class must address both of those concerns. 
Requiring class certification for continued jurisdiction through 
CAFA better comports with both Congress’s grant of jurisdic-
tion and existing case law.157 Further, this approach meets 
CAFA’s goals, while mitigating concerns about abuses of class 
actions within the confines of Congress’s grant of jurisdiction. 
After explaining the mechanics of requiring class certification 
for continued CAFA jurisdiction, this Part demonstrates why 
this requirement is the correct approach when a court denies 
certification.  
A. CLASS CERTIFICATION IS A PREREQUISITE FOR CAFA 
JURISDICTION 
This Note’s thesis is that, when a putative class action is 
brought to federal court through CAFA, Rule 23’s requirements 
for class treatment—which coincide with CAFA’s prerequisites 
for jurisdiction—must be certified for continued jurisdiction.158 
The mechanics of this approach are briefly demonstrated in the 
following paragraph and further explored in the following  
Sections.  
 
 156. See supra Part II. 
 157. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 158. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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If the court determines based on the pleadings that the 
class allegations or other CAFA requirements cannot be met to 
a legal certainty, CAFA cannot provide jurisdiction.159 Essen-
tially, a frivolous or inadequately pleaded class allegation can-
not be sustained under Rule 23 or under CAFA. If the allega-
tions do meet the prerequisites, the court must then consider 
certifying the class and enter an order certifying that the pro-
posed class is (or is not) maintainable under Rule 23.160 CAFA 
explicitly provides jurisdiction until that order,161 but if the 
court denies certification, CAFA ceases to provide jurisdiction. 
If, however, the court certifies the class, CAFA jurisdiction is 
fully and properly invoked in the context of St. Paul Mercury 
and later changes to the certification order cannot oust it. 
B. CLASS CERTIFICATION AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CAFA 
JURISDICTION MEETS THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF CAFA AND 
PROPERLY FITS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ST. PAUL MERCURY 
This Note’s approach—requiring class certification for con-
tinued CAFA jurisdiction—effectively conforms to the language 
of CAFA and fits within the context of St. Paul Mercury’s hold-
ing that jurisdiction, once properly invoked, cannot be ousted 
by later events. While Congress could effect the change sug-
gested in the previous subsection by clarifying the language de-
scribing CAFA’s application,162 the following explains why the 
existing statute and precedents support this approach without 
the need for new or amended legislation.163 
 
 159. Cf. In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (“A 
class is not maintainable as a class action by virtue of its designation as such 
in the pleadings.” (citing Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569, 571 (6th 
Cir. 1970))). 
 160. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person 
sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order 
whether to certify the action as a class action.”). 
 161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2006) (granting jurisdiction until entry of 
the certification order).  
 162. See supra Part II.A (describing specific instances of conflicting inter-
pretations of language in CAFA). 
 163. Congress should amend CAFA to effect this interpretation, however, if 
other courts of appeals continue the current trend. But as both the interpreta-
tion exemplified by Cunningham and the interpretation suggested by this 
Note have greater impact on jurisdictional doctrine than actual litigants, there 
is little pressure to make such a change. 
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1. Class Certification as a Prerequisite for CAFA Jurisdiction 
Meets the Plain Language of CAFA 
Requiring class certification for continued CAFA jurisdic-
tion reflects the plain language of CAFA.164 This approach re-
spects CAFA’s definition of a class action (and CAFA’s interac-
tion with Rule 23), as well as the structure of CAFA. Each of 
these aspects supports jurisdiction being fully and properly in-
voked only after class certification. 
First, CAFA’s definition of a class action encourages re-
quiring class certification for continued jurisdiction because it 
so closely tracks Rule 23’s definition of a class action. CAFA de-
fines a class action as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”165 Rule 23 requires both (1) 
that class allegations meet numerosity, commonality, typicali-
ty, and representative adequacy requirements166 and (2) that a 
court certify that those allegations are met.167 Applied to 
CAFA’s definition of a class action, if the certification order is 
denied, the case ceases to be filed under Rule 23 and therefore 
CAFA jurisdiction ceases to apply.168 Further, this approach co-
incides perfectly with Rule 23’s approach to class actions.169 Re-
quiring class certification for continued CAFA jurisdiction 
makes adequate class allegations a prerequisite for application 
of CAFA,170 but recognizes that class certification must occur 
before jurisdiction is fully and properly invoked.171 
Second, the structure of CAFA similarly supports requiring 
class certification to properly invoke CAFA jurisdiction.172 Since 
CAFA requires jurisdiction to exist “before or after the entry of 
a class certification order,”173 CAFA provides jurisdiction de-
 
 164. Though some courts have argued that the language is ambiguous, see, 
e.g., Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011); Weiner v. Snap-
ple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2011 WL 196930, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 21, 2011) (“The statute does not speak directly to the issue of whether 
class certification is a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction . . . .”), this Note pos-
its that those courts’ interpretation is incorrect. 
 165. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). 
 166. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 167. Id. 23(c)(1). 
 168. See supra note 30 and text accompanying notes 70 & 132. 
 169. See supra notes 20–38 and accompanying text (explaining the prereq-
uisites to class certification). 
 170. Otherwise, the action could not be filed under Rule 23 at all. 
 171. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (c) (defining class action prerequisites and 
certification order procedures). 
 172. See supra Part II.A. 
 173. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2006). 
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spite the lack of a certification order only before a decision is 
made on certification.174 Once a court makes a certification deci-
sion, however, CAFA only applies if the court determines the 
action is maintainable as a class action.  
Using this approach, CAFA’s grant of jurisdiction is not 
properly invoked until the class is certified. As the following 
Section explains, this approach allows application of St. Paul 
Mercury’s holding—jurisdiction, once properly invoked, cannot 
be ousted by later events175—to correctly apply only after a class 
certification decision. 
2. Class Certification as a Prerequisite for CAFA Jurisdiction 
Conforms to St. Paul Mercury 
Requiring class certification for continued CAFA jurisdic-
tion fits the context of St. Paul Mercury’s principle that juris-
diction, once properly invoked, cannot be ousted by later 
events. While application of St. Paul Mercury at the moment of 
filing is improper,176 this Note’s approach creates an appropri-
ate analogy to St. Paul Mercury’s principle. Additionally, since 
that principle requires continued jurisdiction “unless the law 
gives a different rule,”177 and CAFA does in fact give a different 
rule under this approach, St. Paul Mercury requires jurisdic-
tion to end after a court denies class certification. This subsec-
tion explains why certification, not filing, is the appropriate 
moment for St. Paul Mercury to apply. 
One reason is that St. Paul Mercury generally requires 
continued jurisdiction if a plaintiff ’s good-faith claim for dam-
ages meets the jurisdictional amount,178 but notes two excep-
tions to that requirement.179 First, if on the face of the pleadings 
“it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot re-
cover the amount claimed,” the suit should be dismissed.180 The 
second exception applies if it becomes apparent “from the 
proofs . . . that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that 
amount.”181  
 
 174. Id. 
 175. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab. Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938). 
 176. See supra Part II.B. 
 177. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 288. 
 178. Even if the plaintiff is unable to actually recover that amount. Id. at 
289–90. 
 179. Id. at 288–89. 
 180. Id. at 289. 
 181. Id. 
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These two exceptions match this Note’s approach to CAFA 
jurisdiction. For the first exception, CAFA jurisdiction must 
cease if the court determines the class allegations are inade-
quate from the face of the pleadings.182 For the second, CAFA 
jurisdiction must cease if, upon analysis for certification, the 
court finds the putative class was never entitled to class treat-
ment.183 In that sense, St. Paul Mercury provides an appropri-
ate analogy when applied at certification, whereas it could not 
at the time of filing. 
Another reason certification is the proper time to apply St. 
Paul Mercury is that the Supreme Court in St. Paul Mercury 
held that jurisdiction must continue “unless the law gives a dif-
ferent rule.”184 CAFA does in fact give a different rule.185 While 
CAFA grants federal courts jurisdiction to determine, for any 
case adequately pleaded as a class action, if class treatment is 
appropriate,186 it also limits its application after a certification 
decision to cases a court certifies as class actions.187 By limiting 
its jurisdiction after the certification decision, the full invoca-
tion of CAFA jurisdiction cannot be determined with certainty 
until the moment of certification. Until that point, St. Paul 
Mercury cannot apply, as only fully and properly invoked juris-
diction is protected from the effects of later events.188  
The purpose of St. Paul Mercury’s principle is another rea-
son why certification is the proper time to apply St. Paul Mer-
cury. Requiring class certification does not raise the same fo-
rum manipulation concerns that underlay St. Paul Mercury’s 
holding. The Court in St. Paul Mercury noted that “[i]f the 
 
 182. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (stat-
ing that, in some cases, “the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to de-
termine” prerequisites to class certification). 
 183. See supra Part III.A. 
 184. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 288–89. 
 185. See supra note 177; supra text accompanying notes 125–26 (showing 
how CAFA’s limited jurisdiction after certification provides such a “different 
rule”). 
 186. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2006). 
 187. See id. ( limiting jurisdiction to “before or after” class certification, im-
plying that failed class certification ousts jurisdiction). Any doubts about 
whether CAFA provides jurisdiction after denial of certification weigh against 
finding continued jurisdiction. See, e.g., Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 
168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A]ll doubts about jurisdiction should be 
resolved in favor of remand to state court.”); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 
F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[R]emoval statutes are construed narrowly; 
. . . uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.”). 
 188. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 294–95. 
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plaintiff could . . . reduce the amount of his demand to defeat 
federal jurisdiction the defendant’s supposed statutory right of 
removal would be subject to the plaintiff ’s caprice.”189 Though 
some courts ruling that jurisdiction continues after denying 
class certification have expressed similar concerns,190 this ap-
proach, and CAFA’s operation, minimize the potential for 
plaintiffs to abuse class certification and subject the defend-
ant’s right of removal to their caprice.  
There are three ways that CAFA’s operation minimizes 
that potential. First, the class certification determination is left 
to the court, not the plaintiff. Though certification is often ini-
tiated by motion of a party, courts must raise the issue sua 
sponte when necessary.191 Second, Rule 23 requires courts to 
certify the class at an early practicable time.192 Therefore, con-
cerns about parties waiting until the eve of trial to attempt to 
oust jurisdiction are unlikely to be realized. Third, the pre-
sumption that courts should approve the class before ruling on 
dispositive motions193 minimizes concerns about parties abusing 
 
 189. Id. at 294. 
 190. E.g., Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., No. 05-22409-CIV, 2007 WL 
2083562, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2007) (“To litigate the case up to the eve of 
trial, and then to seek remand [by acting to decertify class] after adverse rul-
ings have issued and summary judgment is briefed, equates to a forum shop-
ping which the traditional rules of removal and remand are designed to  
preclude.”). 
 191. See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1785 (“[T]he court has an in-
dependent obligation to decide whether an action brought on a class basis is to 
be so maintained even if neither of the parties moves for a ruling . . . .”); cf. 
Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“Although 
the parties stipulate to the certification, the court has a duty to evaluate inde-
pendently the proposed class to ensure its compliance with FED. R. CIV. P. 23.” 
(citing Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir. 
1993))), rev’d on other grounds, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), aff ’d sub nom. 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 192. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). Though even an early practicable time may 
still be a relatively long time. See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 126 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (waiting over two years before ruling on certification). 
 193. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998) 
(holding that federal courts are generally required to satisfy themselves of ju-
risdiction before ruling on the merits); Edmond, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1019–20 
(“[A] court must resolve [the issue of class certification] before it addresses 
dispositive motions.” (citing DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 920 
F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1990))). But cf. Schweizer v. Trans Union Corp., 136 
F.3d 233, 239 (2d Cir. 1998) (“‘There is nothing in Rule 23 which precludes the 
court from examining the merits of plaintiff ’s claims on a proper Rule 12 mo-
tion to dismiss or Rule 56 motion for summary judgment simply because such 
a motion’ precedes resolution of the issue of class certification.” (quoting 
Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 291 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976))). 
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these procedures after receiving an unfavorable dispositive rul-
ing. Taken together, it is clear that concerns about abuses and 
forum manipulation are hypothetical at best. 
One final reason that certification, not filing, is the appro-
priate time for St. Paul Mercury’s principle to apply is the 
unique nature of class action procedure. Courts have tradition-
ally treated class actions differently when considering similar 
issues.194 The realities of class action litigation require more in-
depth procedural and, in CAFA’s case, jurisdictional inquiries195 
than for other forms of actions.196 CAFA further complicates 
otherwise simple jurisdictional determinations, such as 
amounts in controversy and places of citizenship, and forces 
courts to make at-times lengthy and in-depth determinations. 
For example, at times courts must make exceedingly detailed 
examinations of places of residence for class members to de-
termine if CAFA jurisdiction is appropriate.197 Courts have also 
required similarly detailed examinations into individual claims 
and individual class members to determine jurisdiction.198 The-
se types of “preliminary jurisdictional determination[s]”199 are 
inherent in determining CAFA jurisdiction.200 “[G]iven the criti-
 
 194. See Marcus, supra note 140 (explaining how, until 28 U.S.C. § 1367 
codified supplemental jurisdiction, St. Paul Mercury could not apply to class 
actions as it does to other cases due to the existence of absent class members). 
 195. See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of Jurisdictional Proof, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 409, 414–19 (2008) (describing the unique application of jurisdic-
tional burdens of proof for CAFA).  
 196. See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 205 (1999) (stating 
that class certification determination is “enmeshed in the legal and factual as-
pects of the case” (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 
(1978))). 
 197. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1787 (“‘Despite the logistical challenges 
of offering reliable evidence at this preliminary jurisdictional stage, CAFA 
does not permit the courts to make a citizenship determination on a record 
bare of any evidence showing class members’ [place of citizenship].’” (quoting 
Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 793, 802 (5th 
Cir. 2007))). 
 198. Before CAFA’s $5 million total amount-in-controversy requirement 
(and the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Ser-
vices., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)), courts were forced to make inquiries into 
whether each class member exceeded the $75,000 minimum for diversity ju-
risdiction found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 554–55 
(describing a prior decision in which the Court mandated that “every plaintiff 
must separately satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement”). 
 199. Preston, 485 F.3d at 812. 
 200. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1787 (“That determination could require 
a court either to gather considerable information about those class members’ 
claims or indulge in assumptions that might seem unwarranted given the crit-
ical importance of jurisdiction.”). 
 2012] CAFA JURISDICTION 1181 
 
cal importance of jurisdiction,” courts cannot “indulge in as-
sumptions”201 in examining these jurisdictional issues—courts 
must engage in more rigorous analysis of jurisdictional  
questions. 
In the certification context, the need for more rigorous 
analysis becomes even more important. Recent Supreme Court 
decisions relating to class certification highlight that im-
portance. The opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
PA. v. Allstate Inssurance Co. made clear that there is no dis-
tinction between certifiability and eligibility under Rule 23.202 
Therefore, a court must certify, to satisfy both Rule 23’s and 
CAFA’s requirements, that those prerequisites are, or ever 
were, met. Simply alleging that those prerequisites are met is 
inadequate,203 and therefore not alone sufficient to fully invoke 
jurisdiction, so courts can and often must “delve beyond the 
pleadings to determine whether the requirements for class cer-
tification are satisfied.”204 In sum, class action procedure is ex-
ceedingly complicated. Requiring courts to apply St. Paul Mer-
cury before making these difficult factual inquiries 
misunderstands the unique nature of class action procedure, in 
which courts may only discover that the pleadings are insuffi-
cient to maintain a class after a rigorous factual determination. 
The better approach is the one that this Note advocates: class 
certification is required for continued CAFA jurisdiction. 
On the whole, requiring class certification for continued 
CAFA jurisdiction is more sound than allowing continued ju-
risdiction if certification is denied. Requiring certification bet-
ter conforms with the plain language of CAFA and better suits 
St. Paul Mercury’s principle that jurisdiction properly invoked 
 
 201. Id.; see also supra Part I (describing the relationship between the lim-
its on federal jurisdiction, CAFA’s grant of that jurisdiction, and Rule 23’s op-
eration on class actions). 
 202. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1438 (2010) (stating that eligibility and certifiability are both “precondi-
tions” for class treatment under the federal rule and rejecting the argument 
that the two are distinct issues); see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 1778 (de-
scribing class actions as “constructs approved (indeed, created) by the court’s 
certification order”). 
 203. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (stating that prerequisites for Rule 23 are “not mere pleading 
rules,” and courts must investigate adequacy of class allegations (citing Szabo 
v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675–77 (7th Cir. 2001))). 
 204. Id. (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 1182 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1151 
 
cannot be ousted by later events. As the following Section 
shows, it also better meets Congress’s goals in enacting CAFA. 
C. CLASS CERTIFICATION AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CAFA 
JURISDICTION BETTER MEETS CONGRESS’S GOALS IN ENACTING 
CAFA 
Congress enacted CAFA to allow federal courts to hear in-
terstate cases of national importance205 and intended for CAFA 
to allow federal procedure for class actions to apply to these in-
terstate cases.206 This Note’s approach to jurisdiction following 
denial of class certification advances that goal. 
At first glance, this approach’s requirement that federal 
courts remand or dismiss cases after denying class certification 
may appear contrary to Congress’s stated goal of bringing more 
class actions into federal courts;207 in fact, the court in Cun-
ningham characterized its holding as bolstered by that same 
goal.208 But, as explained below, this Note’s approach does more 
to allow for federal jurisdiction over these class actions than 
the approach favored by the Cunningham court.  
This Note’s approach creates a number of incentives en-
couraging litigation of class actions in federal court. As charac-
terized by Cunningham, CAFA’s purpose is to relax jurisdic-
tional standards to allow for more class actions to more easily 
be litigated in federal court.209 Applying class certification as a 
prerequisite for CAFA jurisdiction effects this goal in a number 
of ways.  
First, this approach may lead to federal courts relaxing the 
baseline class certification standard to more closely align with 
 
 205. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 
Stat. 4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 206. Marcus, supra note 30, at 1788–89. 
 207. As federal courts generally more stringently construe certification re-
quirements, it is possible that a federal court may deny certification, remand 
the case to state court, and have the state court subsequently certify that 
same class. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376–78 (2011); see Cun-
ningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2010) (not-
ing that if “a state happened to have different criteria for certifying a class” 
than the federal standard, “the result of a remand because of the federal 
court’s refusal to certify the class could be that the case would continue as a 
class action in state court”). 
 208. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807 (characterizing CAFA’s purpose as “re-
laxing the requirement of complete diversity of citizenship so that class ac-
tions involving incomplete diversity can be litigated in federal court”). 
 209. Id. 
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state practices.210 This is not to say that federal procedure must 
deteriorate to meet the “drive-by” certification standards that 
led to CAFA’s passage.211 Relaxing the baseline for meeting, for 
example, Rule 23’s commonality and typicality requirements, 
does not affect the increasingly rigorous factual analyses that 
still must apply.212 Instead, this means that federal courts must 
balance Congress’s intent to increase the availability of federal 
procedure for class actions otherwise filed in state courts213 with 
current standards for applying Rule 23’s prerequisites.214  
Further, this approach effectively balances the availability 
of both state and federal fora with Congress’s jurisdictional 
grant in CAFA. Through CAFA, Congress could have, but did 
not, essentially federalize class actions.215 Instead, Congress ex-
panded diversity jurisdiction to allow federal courts to hear “in-
terstate cases of national importance”216 and carved out excep-
 
 210. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1769 (explaining that CAFA may “em-
power future federal courts to become more creative in favor of class action 
treatment,” in ways such as adopting class certification rules similar to those 
of state courts).  
 211. See Marcus, Erie, CAFA, and Federalism, supra note 53, at 1294 (ex-
plaining a pre-CAFA practice in Alabama, much maligned by certain CAFA 
supporters, by which plaintiffs “would file a motion for class certification with 
the complaint and get a decision before the defendant had a chance to file a 
responsive pleading”). 
 212. See Steven R. Peterson & Andrew Y. Lemon, Rigorous Analysis to 
Bridge the Inference Gap in Class Certification, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
93, 94 (2011) (“In the past, plaintiffs could satisfy Rule 23 by making a 
‘threshold showing’ that they would be able to meet the requirements of Rule 
23 at trial. Recently, there has been a movement across the federal appellate 
courts to require increased proof that the requirements of Rule 23 are met pri-
or to a district court’s decision to certify a class. Although there is no unanimi-
ty yet among the federal appellate courts, the Third Circuit’s decision in In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation is emblematic of these new standards 
that require plaintiffs to present a more rigorous analysis demonstrating that 
Rule 23 is satisfied. Specifically, the court now requires that district courts 
make factual determinations that Rule 23 is satisfied, which, by necessity, re-
quires resolving all legal disputes relevant to class certification and considera-
tion of all relevant evidence, including expert testimony, even if there is over-
lap with merits issues.”). 
 213. In this context, the application of Rule 23 and precedent requiring 
more than cursory analysis of the adequacy of class allegations.  
 214. Here, the dividing line between what constitutes sufficient or insuffi-
cient facts to meet Rule 23’s requirements. 
 215. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1809–13 (discussing use of jurisdiction 
to achieve substantive objectives, examining two statutes that do just that, 
and concluding that “Congress went to some pains not to undertake any such 
delegation of lawmaking power in CAFA” (emphasis added)). 
 216. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119 
Stat. 4, 5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)). 
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tions to prevent CAFA from reaching all class actions.217 This 
approach ensures that state courts remain available for cases 
outside the ambit of CAFA, and ensures that CAFA does not 
impermissibly work to impose federal class action procedure on 
state courts.218 Even without indirectly furthering Congress’s 
purposes in enacting CAFA, the principle that federal courts 
are courts of limited jurisdiction mandates limiting CAFA to 
the jurisdictional grant found in the statute’s text.219 
Additionally, this approach may lead to the focus of this 
type of litigation shifting towards the merits and away from the 
certification decision. While the approach exemplified in Cun-
ningham incentivizes continued challenges to certification, this 
Note’s approach reduces the incentive to continue challenging 
certification throughout litigation. Under the Cunningham ap-
proach, defendants can and should challenge certification 
throughout litigation;220 winning the certification fight fre-
quently ends the litigation.221 Under this Note’s approach, cases 
move closer to resolution on the merits without undue prejudice 
to either party beyond the incentives underlying class actions 
as a procedural device.222 
In comparison to the above incentives created by adopting 
this Note’s approach, the approach advocated by the Cunning-
 
 217. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4). 
 218. Normatively, state courts should remain available for state law 
claims, which CAFA inherently affects, if states legislate with state court pro-
cedure as a backdrop, and especially for consumer law claims, where the 
state’s interest rests in protecting its residents. 
 219. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971) (“The pow-
er reserved to the states, under the Constitution, to provide for the determina-
tion of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only by the action of 
Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of the Constitution . . . . Due 
regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actu-
ate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdic-
tion to the precise limits which (a federal) statute has defined.” (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 
263, 270 (1934))). 
 220. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certi-
fication may be altered or amended before final judgment.”). 
 221. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the 
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do 
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting 
his or her rights.” (quotations and citations omitted)). For a critique of those 
incentives, see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 
S. Ct. 1431, 1465 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A court’s decision to certify 
a class . . . places pressure on the defendant to settle” regardless of the merits.). 
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ham court does little to advance CAFA’s purpose of providing a 
federal forum for class actions—when a federal court denies 
class certification, the case can no longer be considered a class 
action.223 Federal courts do little to advance CAFA’s stated goal 
of bringing more class actions to federal court by retaining ju-
risdiction over a single plaintiff ’s claim.224 
Overall, this Note’s approach can lead to both a greater 
number of class actions in federal courts and a greater percent-
age in federal courts (in relation to state courts). While the 
Cunningham court sought to bolster its approach using this 
same reasoning, in practice that approach may well be less ef-
fective in meeting CAFA’s purpose. Similarly, when courts rely 
on St. Paul Mercury to hold that certification does not impact 
CAFA jurisdiction, those courts effectively eviscerate the pur-
pose of St. Paul Mercury’s principle: rather than discouraging 
litigant manipulation and abuse, those courts make certifica-
tion an even more powerful tool for defendants to avoid litiga-
tion on the merits. 
  CONCLUSION   
In cases filed as class actions but denied class certification, 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 cannot provide subject-
matter jurisdiction for federal courts. Continued jurisdiction af-
ter denial of class certification violates the principle that feder-
al courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, is contrary to the 
plain language of the statute, and exceeds Congress’s grant of 
jurisdiction. By remanding these cases to state courts, federal 
courts correctly interpret St. Paul Mercury’s principle that ju-
risdiction once properly invoked cannot be ousted by later 
events, since class certification is required to properly invoke 
CAFA jurisdiction. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 is a 
tool to allow federal courts jurisdiction over many class actions, 
but it cannot provide jurisdiction for those cases that a court 
determines are not class actions. 
 
 223. See supra note 14. 
 224. Richardson, supra note 5, at 125. 
